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of-use#LAAdescribing criteria and procedures for health care technology Medicare coverage
decisions (technology t~J ~ -l coverage rule).4 The rule denes a reasonable and
necessary service as one which is safe and eective, cost-eective, appropriate,
and not experimental or investigational.5 A provision of the rule categorizes
a medical device that has not been approved by the FDA as experimental or
investigational and hence not reimbursible under the reasonable and necessary
standard.6 In this paper I will (1) consider the legal force and implications of
the provision excluding Medicare coverage of all unapproved medical devices,
(2) discuss HCFA's recent eorts to investigate billing for investigational cardiac
devices, (3) consider the impact of reimbursement for investigational device on
device availability and (4) consider ways to reconcile prudent control of health
care expenditures with expeditious promotion of high standards of health care.
1.Legal Force of The Provision Denying Coverage for Unapproved
Devices
While the Social Security Amendments commit considerable dis-
cretion to the Commissioner in implementing Medicare policy,7 HCFA's rules
must conform to statutory language and intent.8 While the statute forbids pay-
ment for any expenses incurred for items and services which are not reasonable
and necessary9 ,the terms reasonable and necessary are not dened by statute
454 FR 4302,4307, January 30, 1989 and 42 CFR s405380, s405 381, s405.382, and s405.383
(1989).
542 CFR s 405.380(a)(2).
642 CFR s 405380(b)(2)(iii).
742 U.S.C. s 1395hh(a) and s 1395y.
8v. Jeerson County Bd. of Ed., 372 F.2d 836, decree corrected 380 F.2d 385, certiorari
denied 88 S.Ct. 77,389 U.S. 840, 19 L.Ed.2d 103 (1967) (agency construction must corifomi
to the law and be reasonable).
941 U.S.C. s 1395y(a~1)(A).
2or explained in the legislative history.10 As HCFA has noted, the Medicare law
was designed generally to cover services ordinarily furnished by hospitals, skilled
nursing facilities, and physicians.11
a.Process considerations
The provision denying coverage for unapproved devices (device pro-
vision) deems all such devices to be not reasonable and necessary. 12If the device
provision is categorized as a substantive rule, as case law suggests it should be,
the rule lacks the force of law because it has not yet completed the required
rulemaking process (discussed below). If classied as an interpretive rule, the
device provision lacks the force of law since interpretive rules are merely advisory
~13 Language in Medicare coverage manuals excluding coverage for unapproved
devices is of similar, advisory, weight.14
Although the technology device rule contains substantive and in-
terpretive elements, the device provision within this rule is more appropriately
classied as substantive since it does more than simply clarify a statuory term
or continue agency policy. 15The provision demands per se exclusion of cov-
erage for all unapproved medical devices even if reasonable and necessary for
10Senate Report No. 404 for the 1965 Social Security Aniendmerns merely states that rental
of a special hospital bed for home use, massages, and heat lamp treatments would be covered
only if reasonable and necessary for treatment.
1154FR430243()4
12Medicare coverage of investigational intraocular lenses was an exception to the general
rule that denies Medicare payment for medical devices that have not received FDA approval.
56 FR 19874(1991). The Department of HITS made this coverage available in response to a
Congressional directive to make the intraocular lenses reasonably available.
13j ~ Casa Del Convaleciente v. Sullivan, C.A. I (Puerto Rico) 1992,964 F.2d 1175.
14See Medicare Intermediary Manual and Medicare Carriers Manual, U.S. Dept. of HHS.
and SeeSt. Alarv's Hospital of Troy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 788 F.2d 888,890
(2d Cir. 1986) and Goodman v. Sullivan 712 F. Supp. 334,338,891 F.2d 449(1989).
15National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Ass n. Inc. v. Sullivan,
C.A.D.C.1992, 979 F.2d. 227.
3exclusion of coverage for unapproved medical devices is a criterion in the na-
tional coverage determination process rather than a product of it.23 The process
for making national coverage decisions elaborated by the technology coverage
rule involves identication of coverage issues for national decisions, selection
of coverage issues by the Bureau of Eligibility, Reimbursement and Coverage
within HCFA, and HCFA analysis which includes background papers, review
by the HCFA Physicians Panel, and Public Health Service (PHS) assessment.
The Oce of Health Technology Assessment (OHTA) collects and evaluates
information from many sources including medical literature, Federal agencies,
clinical medical specialty groups, and manufacturers associations for the PHS.
The OHTA report is later made available to the public. After considering the
PHS coverage recommendation, HCFA decides whether or not a service should
be covered using numerous criteria which consider safety and eectiveness, in-
vestigational status, and appropriateness. HCFA publishes national coverage
decisions in the Medicare Coverage Issues Manual, other HCFA manuals or in
the Federal Register subject to reevaluation and reconsideration.
The medical device provision is not the product of a particularized
determination of coverage for particular types of services reached through the
complex process described. Although, broadly speaking, it addresses a class
of services-services involving investigational devices-this grouping of services in
much less particular in scope than the determinations listed in the Medicare
Coverage Issues Manual as national coverage decisions (coverage issues include
covered. .. shall not be held unlawful or set aside on the ground that a requirement of 5 USC
x 553 or 42 USC x 1395hh(b) relating to publication or public comment was not satised.
23See 42 CFR 405.380(1989).
5colonic irrigation, manipulation, and ultrasonic surgery) 24those recognized by
courts as representing national coverage decisions (covering liver transplants or
chelation therapy).25
Should HCFA complete the rulemaking process by publishing the
technology regulation in nal rule form, the provision denying coverage for un-
approved devices would be subject to invalidation only if found to be arbitrary
or capricious or otherwise inconsistent with statutory authority. Although the
arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow, it may call for invalidation of reg-
ulations if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended
it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
oered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a dierence
in view of the product of agency expertise.26 The following discussion will ex-
plore aspects of the problem of reimbursement of investigational devices that
Medicare coverage policy concerning unapproved devices should address.
b.The Merits of Considering all Unapproved Devices Not Reasonable and Necessary
i.Rationales for the exclusion of coverage for una~proved devices
A number of rationales support denial of coverage for all medi-
cal devices which have not received FDA approval. First, from the standpoint
of administrative economy, it makes sense for HCFA to make use of FDA ex-
24Medicare Program; National Coverage Decisions, 54 FR 34555,34556, August 21, 1989.
25~See Presbyterian University Hospital of Pitt.sburgh v. lacovetto and Bowen 1989 WL
248274 (W.D.Pa) (denying benets for liver transplants is a national coverage determination)
and Friedrich v. Secretary of Health and Human Services 894 F.2d 829(6th Cir. 1990)
(denying payment for chelation therapy is a national coverage determination).
26Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co..
463 U.S. 29, 103 S.Ct. 2856,2866,77 L.Ed. 2d 443 (1983) cited in St. James Hosp. v. Heckler,
760 F.2d 1460
6pertise, resources and judgments in evaluating the reasonableness and neces-
sity of devices ~27 While HCFA may superimpose its own appraisals of cost-
eectiveness, clinical use, ecacy and safety in determining suitability for cov-
erage,28 it should not wastefully duplicate the eorts of the FDA. Both the FDA
and HCFA lack sucient resources to keep up with demands for technology as-
sessments.29 With only ve professional sta the Oce of Health Technology
Assessment studies HCFA's requests for technology assessments of national con-
cern to Medicare, ORTA has evaluated fewer than 10 technologies per year.30
As a result, HCFA relies on its 79 Part A and Part B contractors to make most
Medicare coverage decisions.31 Reliance upon FDA approval status in making
coverage decisions may help avoid additional uncertainty and duplication in a
technology assessment system which is already overburdened.
Second, HCFA may favor a broad rule to protect Medicare pa-
tients from inecacious or unsafe devices and to assure that Medicare dollars
will not be fraudulently diverted to pay for research on unproven therapies.
Patients rely on HCFA to protect the quality of care which they receive espe-
cially since they are often less than fully informed about the potential benets
and risk of recommended therapies. Physicians have ethical and legal obliga-
tions to provide appropriate care but such obligations imperfectly safeguard the
27D.A. Kessleretal., 'The Federal Regulation of Medical Devices, 317 N. Engi. J. Med.
357,363(1987).
28See 54 FR 4302.4307.
29Senator Kennedy, Statements of Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 140 Cong Rec 5
8821 (1994) (noting the mismatch between the eniand for agency review and declining FDA




7process is demonstrated by the case of C.R. Bard Inc., a manufacturer that
agreed to pay $ 61 million in civil and criminal nes after pleading guilty to 391
criminal charges related to the sale of untested cardiac catheters, illegal clinical
experimentation and concealing serious device aws.36
Fourth, denial of reimbursement for investigational devices may
help slow the rise in Medicare reimbursement costs. New technology is a fre-
quently cited cause for increases in health care costs. Medicare has attempted
to account for the costs of new technology by revising DRG weights, rearranging
DRG assignments, and occasionally creating new DRGs.37 HCFA is required
by law to revise the DRG system each year. Since dollars available to spend
on Medicare reimbursement is limited, excluding payment for investigational
devices may provide a mechanism for rationing those dollars.
Finally, a broad rule excluding all unapproved devices is easier and
less cosdy to administer than rules providing more particularized guidance for
judging the reasonableness and necessity of medical care. Ironically, adminis-
trative costs incurred limiting coverage for the purpose of cost-control can result
in overall increases in health expenditures.38 Easy to apply coverage decisions
save administrative costs leaving more health care dollars available to pay for
health care.
36Vera Titunik, Northeast, U.S. v. C.R.Bard, The American Lawyer, December 1993, p.86
and Robert Pear, Medicare Inquiry Subpoenas lOOHospitals. N.Y. Times, June 18,1994, at
11.
37Medicare: Technology Assessment and Medical Coverage Decisions, GAO Report, July
21,1994.
385ee S. Woolbandler and D. U. Hiinmelstein, 'The Deteriorating Administrative Eciency
of the U.S. Health Care System, 324 N.EIIRI. J. Med. 1253(1991) and D.A. Redelmeier and
yR. Fuchs, Hospital Expenditures in the United States and Canada, 328 N.Ennl. J. Med.
772(1993).
9ii.Criticiue of the exclusion of covera2e for unanproved devices
Although the rationales for denial of coverage for investigational
devices have some force, the consequences of such denial may not be as favorable
as those rationales suggest.
First, an absolute requirement of FDA approval may not properly
provide for the reasonable clinical needs of many patients. While the require-
ment for FDA approval appropriately excludes coverage for devices which FDA
has rejected as well as for untested devices, it also excludes payment for unap-
proved devices which are reasonable and necessary for health care. The FDA
itself has accepted departures from the approval process thus acknowledging
that unapproved medical devices may be required for emergency use39 and that
unapproved uses of approved drugs may be medically appropriate.40 Courts
interpreting insurance contracts which restrict coverage to
11 medically necessary treatments have held that a treatment need
not be FDA approved in order to be medically necessary.41 The chief diculty
with reliance on FDA approval as a standard for reimbursement is that such
standard tends to lag behind medical progress because of delays in agency re-
view. Limitations in FDA resources produce substantial backlogs, the number
39Guidance for the Emergency Use of Unapproved Medical Devices; Availability
4037 FR 16,5(13 (1972). The legitimacy of certain o-label uses has also been recognized by
courts and state legislatures. In Weaver v. Reagen , 886 F.2d 194(8th Cir. 1989). the court
found that o-label use of AZT may be medically necessary and thus warrant Medicare
coverage. New York and Michigan statutes forbid insurers from excluding coverage of
o-label uses of certain cancer drugs, N.Y. Ins. Law x 3216(h)(12) (McKinney Supp. 1991)
and Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. xx 333.21054b (West 1991).
415ee Mc Laughlin v. Connecticut General Dfe Ins. Co. (1983, ND Cal) 565 F. Supp. 434
(Despite lack of FDA approval for immunonugmentive therapy such treatment was medically
necessary with the meaining of insurance policy) and Schumake v. Travelers Ins. Co.
(1985)147 Mich App 600,383 NW2d 259 (Laetrile treatments were medically necessary within
meaning of insurance policy because patients physician recommended them before they were
discredited.)
10of overdue 510(k) submissions increasing from 330 in 1992 to 1,895 in 1993.
510(k) review times rose from 98 days in 1990 to 213 in 1994.42 Review times
for premarket approval applications rose from 415 days in 1990 to 840 in 1994.43
When the technology coverage rule was rst published in 1989 the requirement
for FDA approval might have been expected to cause minimal delay in the
availability of useful, new medical devices. The increased FDA backlog since
then has increased the impact of the FDA approval requirement since it is now
more likely that reasonable and necessary devices will remain unapproved for
signicant periods of time.
Second, although denying payment for service considered experi-
mental or investigational is a standard method of avoiding diversion of funds
for clinical care to fund research, such terms may obscure the complexity of
distinguishing research from clinical purposes and distinguishing unproven from
proven therapy. Ethical clinical research depends on the presumption that study
of a device to further dene its clinical benet can be made consistent with the
appropriate treatment of patients participating in
12 the clinical trial. Although investigational is commonly under-
stood as being synonymous with experimental or unproven, investigational is a
also a term of art in the FDA device approval process. Medical devices which are
awaiting FDA approval for marketing receive investigational device exemptions
for clinical testing and limited clinical use. A device may be investigational in
the sense of not having received marketing approval although its eectiveness
42140 Cong Rec 5 8821, July 12, 1994.
43103 H.Rpt. 751, Medical Device User Fee Act of 1994, Dissenting views, Sept. 26,
1994.
11and safety has been scientically proven. While the FDAs role as protector of
the safety of the medical devices requires it to forestall approval of such devices
until it has the time to evaluate their risks, sick patients also face the risks
of their own illnesses which require treatment in a timely fashion. A delay in
device approval in the name of safety may actually produce a net loss in lives
and increase in morbidity.44
The technology coverage rule itself contains provisions which at-
tempt to accommodate urgent needs for medical care which cannot wait for
slow, albeit sound, administrative approval processes. First, the rule provides
for coverage of certain investigational cancer drugs for terminally ill cancer pa-
tients.45 Second, the regulations note that less stringent standards for safety and
eectiveness will be applied to breakthrough medical or surgical procedures.46
Third, the regulations contemplate the coverage of o-label use of drugs and
devices should such use be medically appropriate.47 However, the regulations
do not provide coverage for critically ill patients who may require treatment
with investigational devices as urgently as terminally ill cancer patients require
investigational drug treatment. The provision permitting less stringent proof
of safety and eectiveness for breakthrough medical or surgical procedures con-
icts with denial of payment for investigational devices since many of these
breakthrough medical or surgical procedures require investigational devices for
445ee M. Kinsley, 'The FDA: Too Cautious, Not Too Bold, The Washin2ton Post, August
10, 1989, p. A25 (citing coniplaints that the slow FDA approval process may
be detrimental to the public's health but also cautioning that abandonment of
regulation would also be unwise).
4542 CFR Part 405.380 (b)(2)(ii).
46See 42 CFR Part 405380 (b)( 1)(v)
4754 FR 4302,4306.
12their implementation.
Third, denial of Medicare reimbursement for all investigational de-
vices is not a prerequisite for assuring that device manufacturers comply with
the FDA approval process. If reimbursement for investigational devices were
subject to limitations such as facility or patient selection criteria as well as
subsequent revision, manufacturers would remain motivated to obtain FDA ap-
proval. Current FDA regulation prohibits investigators from charging subjects
a price larger than that necessary to recover costs of manufacture, research, de-
velopment and handling. The FDA has recently published an Advance Notice
of Proposed Rule-Making (ANPRM) indicating that it is considering revising
the regulation to further limit charging for investigational devices. While al-
lowing manufacturers to charge for investigational devices may encourage the
development of medical devices such payments should not be permitted to allow
manufacturers to earn prots and thus escape the requirement of the FDA.
If the payment manufacturers receive for investigational devices is
limited, the chief ect of permitting coverage for investigational devices may be
to reimburse hospitals for providing services related to the medical device use.
Fourth, although denial of payment for all investigational devices
may decrease the cost of Medicare reimbursement such cost-cutting is justiable
only if it is consistent with appropriate medical care. Potential gains in cost-
containment from such denial must be balanced against potential health benets
lost. Such balancing is not possible when an across-the-board rule is in eect.
An across-the-board exclusion of unapproved devices is inconsistent with the
13for necessary investigational devices:
1.Hospitals and physicians continue to provide the investigational
device to some or all patients for whom the device is appropriate. a.Patients
with sucient funds or other insurance coverage to pay for the investigational
device pay health care providers for the device and related services. However,
patients told that Medicare has determined that such care is not reasonable and
necessary may refuse treatment on the basis of that judgment even though the
device is actually reasonable and necessary for their care.49 b.i. Patients lacking
funds or insurance to pay for the investigational device receive the device and
related services free of charge. Costs of the device and related services may be
shifted to other insurers and patients. Hospitals that continue to provide the
device may suer considerable Ions and may be put at a competitive disadvan-
tage because they have fewer funds available to provide services or amenities
compared to hospitals who do not suer the expense of providing such charity.
cr ii.Patients who are unable to pay for the device are selectively denied the
device. They may then receive care that is less appropriate or benecial than
treatment involving the investigational device. However, Medicare regulations
provide for termination of providers who discriminatorily deny care to Medicare
patients.50
49Medicare policy attempts to avoid reliance upon its denial of payment decisions as evi-
dence that a physician's choice is inappropriate or that a patinet does not need treatment by
providing a full explanation of the true import of denial in denial notices. However, patients
informed by their physicians that a treatment is not covered by Medicare may not receive
such notices should they refuse treatment and thus not produce a payment claim.
5042 C.F.R.s 489.53(aX2) provides that HCFA may terminate the agreement with any
provider if HCFA nds that a provider places restrictions on the persons it will accept for
treatment and it fails either to exempt Medicare beneciaries from those restzictions or to
apply them to Medicare beneciaries the same as to all other persons seeking care.
152. Physicians and hospitals are dissuaded from oering medically
appropriate investigational devices to all patients. Although Medicare's tech-
nology rule directly applies only to Medicare patients, health care providers
may deny the technology to all patients for two reasons. First, the scope of
coverage by other insurers often mirrors that of Medicare so patients who have
insurance other than Medicare may also lack coverage for the devices.51 Second,
denial of access to the unapproved technology to all patients avoids charges of
discrimination. 52
Tort law demands that health care providers provide appropriate
care. Although use of an investigational device is not generally thought of as
standard for malpractice purpose, courts have noted that physicians with spe-
cial knowledge or expertise are required to employ such faculties in treating
their patients.53 In addition, a rule awaiting nal publication authorizes Peer
Review Organization to deny Medicare payment to a for substandard quality
services.54 Denial of medically necessary investigational devices to patients also
violates ethical obligations of physicians and hospitals to provide appropriate
care but such denial may be induced, even mandated, by denial of Medicare
reimbursement. Thus, across the board denial of reimbursement for investiga-
51For example, a regulation governing benets under the Civilian Health and Medical Pro-
gram of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) excludes coverage for devices that have not been
approved by the FDA. See also, Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan of Northern Indiana, In-
corporated, 19 F.3d 322,325 (1994) in which an employee welfare benet plan denied coverage
for any procedure, device, or drug which any government agency, including the FDA, the Of-
ce of Technology Assessment, and the HCFA Medicare Coverage Issues Manual considers
to be experimental or investigational or not reasonable and necessary.
525ee 42 C.F.R s 489.53(aX2), n.50.
535ee Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hospital, 88 A.D.2d 217, (1982). The court en-
dorsed the following jury charge: If a physician fails to employ his expertise or
best judgment, and that omission causes injury, he should not automatically be
freed from liability because in fact he adhered to acceptable practice.
5454FR 1956, January 18, 1989.
16tional medical devices may conict with HCFAs goals of protecting the quality
of care received by Medicare patients and of assuring that Federal funds are
expended only for medical services that are appropriate to meet an individual's
medical needs.
HCFA's Investigation of Billing for Investigational Cardiac Devices
HCFA has signaled interest in enforcing the exclusion of coverage
for investigational devices. In June of 1994 June Gibbs Brown, the inspector
general of the Department of Health and Human Services issued subpoenas to
132 hospitals to determine whether the hospitals had submitted false or im-
proper claims to Medicare and Medicaid for the use of medical devices not
approved by the FDA.55 Some cardiac device manufacturers were also sub-
poened for information on sales of unapproved medical devices to hospitals.56
The investigators are presumed to be looking for cases in which Medicare and
Medicaid were billed for the use of investigational devices including cases in
which hospitals billed Medicare for purchase of devices which they had received
free of charge from manufacturers. The probe is also apparently looking for
any illicit nancial incentives manufacturers may have given hospitals related
to their use of unapproved devices.57 Such incentives could represent viola-
tions of the Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse provision which imposes
criminal penalties for iligeal remuneration to induce referrals or purchases.58
55R. Pear, Medicare Inquiry Subpoenas 100 Hospitals, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1994, at 11
and S. Shepard, HCFA may request paybacks on medicare payments; Health Care Financing
Administradon, MemDhis Business Journal, December 19, 1994, at. 23
56Barlas, Pete, Ventritex Included in Medicare Investigation, 12 ~ 3. August 1, 1994.
57FDC Reports Inc., The Gray Sheet 1994. June 27, 1994.
5842 U.S.C. x 1320a-7b(b).
17The apparent impetus for the investigation was a whistle-blower lawsuit led in
Seattle.59 The subpoenas requested lists of all procedure performed from April
5, 1984 through March 31, 1994, involving devices not approved by the FDA
for marketing, including unapproved uses of approved devices. The subpoenas
were later limited to the use of nonapproved devices.
The False Claims Act provides for civil penalties for any person
who knowingly presents or causes to be presented...a false or fraudulent claim
for payment or approval or who creates or uses a false record to get a false or
fraudulent claim paid by the Government.60 Discontinuities in hospital billing
processes might result in inadvertant billing for investigational device. However
since acting with deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the trust or falsity
of information is sucient to meet the knowing or knowingly standard, lack of
actual knowledge of a false claim is not a defense to a false claim charge. On
the other hand, as noted above, the provision excluding Medicare coverage for
devices unapproved by the FDA has not completed the rulemaking process so
its legal force as a basis for refunds and penalties is subject to dispute.
Physicians contend that some investigational cardiac devices have
become elements of the standard of medical care, particularly in situations in
which they save patients from more risky and expensive procedures such as
surgery. Thus, these devices are reasonable and necessary to health care despite
their unapproved status. An example is the implantable cardioverter debrilla-
tor (LCD). An LCD responds to potentially lethal cardiac rhythm disturbances
59McCormick, Brian, IG has 'dragnet'booking into cardiac fraud, 37 American
Medical News 64, November 7.1994.
6031 U.S.C. s3729.
18by delivering electric shocks to the heart. Although the rst LCD-type device
was approved by the FDA in 1985, the FDA has been slow to approve improve-
ments in the devices, slowing the availability of improved devices to patients
who are at high risk for sudden death.61 Implantation of the leads for these
devices originally required open chest surgery but newer lead systems are now
available which permit implantation transvenously (through veins which lead
to the heart) and which are associated with signicant decreases in perioper-
ative mortality. Approval of the premarket application for the rst of these
devices, the Endotak, took about 17 months. Although this approval time is a
typical one for the agency, the restricted availability of the device during the
approval process created concerns that patients were being denied lifesaving
therapy. While two of these transvenous lead systems have received FDA ap-
proval for marketing,62 the FDA has not approved use of these lead systems in
combination with ICDs which were not referred to at the time of the premarket
approval.63
The Impact of Medicare Reimbursement For New Devices on De-
vice Availability
Medicare coverage and reimbursement decisions aect the availabil-
ity of devices which have already been developed and expectations for device
development in the future.64 These decisions aect the liklihood that patients
610ne device approval took two and one-half years after the preinarket approlcation was
completed despite panel recommendation for approval. See D.M. Steinhaus, How Should
FDA Regulation of Devices Change? 48 Food and Dma L. J. 709(1993).
62See D.M. Steinhause, n. 52 at 710.
631n a Decemba~ 1, 1993 warning letter the FDA stated that Ventritex must issue Dear
Doctor letters retracting a promotion it had carried out recommending use of its lCD with
CPI's Endotak leads because such combination had not received FDA approval.
64D.A. Kessler et al., 'The Federal Regulation of Medical Devices, 317 N. EnnI. J. Med.,
19will be oered treatment with a new device because they aect the degree to
which manufacturers will be motivated to make the device available as well as
the nancial incentives of hospitals to either encourage or discourage physicians
from making use of the device. In the long run, availability of insurance coverage
for new devices impacts the intensity of development of new technology because
the promptness and amount of such coverage inuences the likelihood that a
manufacturer will be able to recoup its substantial investments in research and
technology.
Doubt about Medicare coverage may chill use of a device and in-
novation of it. Industry ocials assert that the HHS probe of cardiac devices
is limiting access of Medicare patients to invasive cardiology services and warn
that it may encourage manufacturers to investigate or release medical devices
abroad.65 Kristen Morris, director of government aairs for the Health Industry
Manufacturer's Association, contends that the threat of loss of Medicare pay-
ment for investigational devices is slowing the development of new products in
the cardiac eld.66
Even new technologies which are unambiguously covered by Medi-
care may be discouraged if they are undercompensated. A recent study demon-
strated that Medicare's prospective payment system systematically undercom-
pensates non-capital technology costing $1,000 or more.67 An example is the
357,3634 (1987) and N.A. Kane and P.D. Manoukian, Prospective Payment Sys-
tem and New Technology, 32 ~ Enal. J. Med. 1378(1989).
655ee McCormick, Brian, IG has 'dragnet'looking into cardiac fraud. 37 American Medical
News 64, November 7,1994 and Barlas, Pete, Ventritex included in Medicare investigation.
12 ~j 3, August 1. 1994.
66McCormick a..54.
67Kathryn S. Taylor, 'Tech-intensive DRGs: Study nds bias toward underpayment, 68
20implantable cardiac debrillator for which the average payment from Medicare
is $34,000 while the average cost is $38,000.
The history of the cochlcar implant demonstrates the eect Medi-
care DRG assignment can have on the adoption of new technology.68 Although
epidemiologic data suggests that large numbers of people with hearing disabil-
ities might benet from this device, it has been implanted in relatively small
numbers of people since it was approved for marketing by the FDA in 1984.
The device had been covered by Medicare since 1986 but it has been assigned
to a DRG with a payment level well below its cost. This led hospitals to ration
the availability of the device so that very few devices were implanted (only 69
cochlear implants in scal 1987). 3 of the 5 rms in the cochier implant market
left it. N.M. Kane and P.D. Manoukian suggest that the reason cochlear im-
plants were not more widely adopted is because physicians wanting to perform
the procedure had to overcome the hospital's strong nancial disincentives.69
HCFA has received complaints that the weight of the DRG 49 for
cochlear implants is too low since it published the prospective payment rule
in September 3, 1986.70 100 Medicare cochlear implant cases occured in 1991.
Although the agency noted that cochlear implant incurred higher charges than
the average for its DRG the agency concluded that the volume of cases did not
justify a DRG modication.71 While this conclusion may serve administrative
Hosuitals 70(1994).
68N.A. Kane and PD. Manoukian, Prospective Payment System and New Technology, 32
N. En2l. J. Med. 1378(1989). (The article also refers to the role of reimbursement




21economy, it is an ironic one because it may cause low volume use to continue
since the DRG assignment is likely depressing the volume of cochlear implant
cases. There were a total of 81 cochlear implant Medicare cases in 1993.72 In
1993, HCFA moved the lowest charge procedure in the DRO which resulted in
a slight increase in the average charge for DRG 49. The eect, if any, of this
change on the volume of procedures has not yet been published. The agency
responded to criticism of below cost reimbursement for cochlear implants by
stating that it is providing an incentive for hospitals to treat a mix of patients
and to oset losses with gains.73 Since hospitals have many sources of bad
debt and must meet demands for charity to satisfy state and federal law74 they
risk nancial instability depending upon the reimbursement mix of patients
they treat. Although hospitals may cost shift, they ultimately face a nancial
bottom line vulnerable to unrelieved losses. Furthermore, for-prot health care
providers may exhibit prot-maximizing behavior.75 The agency responded to a
comment that cochlear implants may not be available to Medicare beneciaries
in the future by noting that a hospital may be terminated from participation in
Medicare if it places restrictions on the persons its accepts for treatment which
it does not apply equally to Medicare patients as to all other persons.76 While
72~ 45330,45343 (1994).
73Id.
74Federal law as well as the statutes of several states (e.g. N.Y. -McKinne~s Pub. Health
Law x2805-b(2) )require hospitals to provide emergency care. See the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act 42U.S.C.x 1395dd.
75G de Umiovoy et al., 'The relationship of provider organizational status and erythropoietin
dosing us end stage renal disease patients, 32 Med Care (United States) 130 (1994) (With
xed Medicare payment per dose of erythropoietin (EPO), for-prot, free-standing providers
prescribed EPO more often and in smaller doses than nonprot or government providers, such
behavior being consistent with protmaximization. )
761d citing 42 CER 489.53(a)(2).
22the regulation barring discriminating against Medicare patients may prevent
hospitals from selectively excluding them (at least overtly) it does not protect
against the concerns that all patients may have restricted access to cochlear
devices and that the quality of these devices is not what it might have been had
the demand for the devices been allowed to more closely matched the need for
them. Evidence indicates that low volume of sales has dissuaded a manufacturer
from improving the device.77
Potential Solutions
a.Coveraae for The ADDroDriate Use of Investigational Devices
Although a rule excluding Medicare coverage for all devices unap-
proved by the FDA may be easy to administer, it is likely to discourage and
penalize provision of some types of reasonable and necessary care to Medicare
patients. A more exible rule allowing reimbursement for appropriate use of
investigational devices could avoid this problem. While a default rule of denial
of reimbursement for unapproved devices could apply, physicians and patients
would be allowed to show that reasonable and necessary care requires use of an
investigational device. In order to insure that investigational devices are used
appropriately, Medicare reimbursement could be made contingent upon use un-
der an Investigational Device Exemption and satisfaction of specic facility and
patient selection criteria, as may be required for breakthrough procedures. 78
A more rapid FDA approval process would help decrease the num-
77See N.M. Ku~e and P. D. Manukian a. 58, at 1380 noting that the 3M Com-
pany stopped actively marketing the single-channel model and halted research on
the mutichannel device because of the low volume of sales.
78See 42 CFR Part 405.380 (b)(lXv), provision on breakthough procedures.
23ber of medically necessary, unapproved devices. An increase in the medical
device user fee (analogous to the prescription drug fee) paid by device manufac-
turers to the FDA could be used to pay for increased FDA sta and resources
to help speed the FDA clearance process79 and thus lessen the delay between
proof of clinical eectiveness and FDA approval for
24 marketing. Device manufacturers have signaled their willingness
to pay such an increased fee.80 If the fee leads to a speedier approval process, de-
vice manufacturers would save costs incurred by delays in the approval process.
Patients and physicians would benet from more rapid availability of benecial
devices and perhaps reduced device costs. Insurers, including HCFA, would
benet from being able to rely on the FDA for timely advice concerning new
developments.
b.Reimbursement for New Devices
The DRG system as currently applied tends to undercompensate
new technologies because new devices are often placed in DRGs with average
costs below those of the new device.81 In each DRG, HCFA attempts to classify
clinically similar patients who use approximately the same amount of hospital
resources. HCFA also attempts to maintain enough cases in each DRG to allow
for stability within the DRG over time.82 While this classication scheme is
79Such a fee was proposed in bills introduced to Congress in 1994 under the sponsorship of
Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Representative Henry A. Waxman. S.22'76, 140 Cong Rec
58821 and fIR 4864, 140 Cong RecE 1442.
80The Health Industry Manufacturers Association, representing manufacturers
of over 90 percent of U.S. health technology endorsed the 1994 140 Cong. Rec.
8821.
81Kathryn S. Taylor. 'Tech-intensive DRGs: Study nds bias toward underpayment, 68
Hospitals 70(1994).
8259 FR 45330.45343.
24well-suited to devices whose clinical use and costs are expected to be relatively
stable over time, it may tend to chill usage and development of new devices.
If a new technology provides benets that are substantially greater than those
provided by older technology, paying a higher price for the new device than
for the lesser alternatives may be justied even in a cost-conscious health care
system. New devices may be expected to show more improvement in cost and
renement in the years immediately following their release than devices which
have been available for a long time because substantial gains in information
about their clinical and technical properties and their manufacture are more
likely. A liberalization of DRO categorization in the early years of product
release would improve access to new devices and incentives to develop them.83
A relatively high cost for a device may be justied early on if the cost can
be expected to later decline through the eects of eciency and competition.
After a -few years the device could be assigned to a more stringent category
of reimbursement reective of a maturing industry. The prices of even such
complex technologies as bone marrow transplants have declined due to advances
in technology and eciency (although critics suspect some of the price cuts come
at the expense of quality or are achieved by cross-subsidies).84
Conclusion
Although Medicare reimbursement for health care services is not
aimed at funding or stimulating research, Medicare law is designed to protect
83N.A. Kane and P.D. Manoukian, Prospective Payment System and New Technology, 32
~L~ggjJ.. Med. 1378, 1382 (1989).
84George Anders, On Sale Now at Your HMO: Organ Transplants, Wail Street
Journal, Jan. 17.1995 at Bi.
25the quality of health care available to Medicare beneciaries. The quality of care
depends upon access to new technology today and in the future. Reimburse-
ment mechanisms which undercompensate new technology may slow increases
in health costs by diminishing the inuence of technological developments on
the standard of care, eliminating some waste but also some innovation. Medi-
care policy should not draw so tight a circle around existing practice that the
benets of new developments are left out.
26